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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

THOMAS F. EAGLETON: A MODEL OF INTEGRITY

LOUIS FISHER*
In 1975, I was invited to participate in an all-day conference held in
Washington, D.C. to analyze Executive-Legislative conflicts. The objective
was to survey the meaning of the pitched battles between Congress and the
presidency during the Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon administrations.
Throughout the morning and afternoon we were joined by senators and
representatives. In an informed, thoughtful, and articulate manner they
explained different issues, personalities, and procedures. Senior editors and
writers from the media sat around the room listening intently. Occasionally I
would watch their eyes and expressions to gauge their evaluations. That
evening, at the Kennedy Center, we continued the conversation over cocktails
and dinner. Again the editors and writers stood nearby to listen. After I
finished a conversation with Senator Tom Eagleton, they quickly closed in
around me and asked, visibly shaken: “Are other members of Congress this
bright?” I assured them they were. I wondered what stereotypes about
Congress they had promoted over the years without ever getting to know their
subject.
Tom Eagleton had a very special capacity to combine intelligence, public
service, and a commitment to integrity, honesty, and plain speaking. Those
values were in full view with the work he did on war powers. He understood
that core constitutional principles kept the war power with the popularly
elected Congress. When he saw those values violated he did what he could to
restore the model of government fashioned by the Framers. He watched what
the House proposed, participated actively in Senate debates and the drafting of
the War Powers Resolution, and reacted to what emerged from conference
committee. Throughout those years of debate he stood out prominently as
someone who understood the constitutional values at stake and was willing,
when others were not, to speak forcefully and clearly when those values were
betrayed.

* Louis Fisher is a specialist in constitutional law at the Law Library, the Library of Congress.
He received a Bachelor of Science from the College of William and Mary and a Ph.D. in 1967
from the New School for Social Research. The views expressed here are personal, not
institutional.
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I. HOUSE ACTION
In 1970, the House of Representatives passed a War Powers Resolution by
a vote of 289 to 39.1 It recognized that “the President in certain extraordinary
and emergency circumstances has the authority to defend the United States and
its citizens without specific prior authorization by the Congress.”2 Instead of
trying to identify the occasions where presidents are entitled to act unilaterally,
the House chose to rely on procedural safeguards. The President would be
required, “whenever feasible”, to consult with Congress before sending
American forces into armed conflict.3 Consulting with whom, or when, was
not specified. The bill required the President to report the circumstances
necessitating the action; the constitutional, legislative, and treaty provisions
authorizing the action, “together with his reasons for not seeking specific prior
congressional authorization”; and “the estimated scope of activities.”4 Bottom
line: the House was willing to let the President do whatever he thought proper
and necessary and report back afterwards. Congressional abdication could not
be more sweeping.
Both houses later passed War Powers Resolutions that went beyond mere
reporting requirements. The House of Representatives, following its earlier
example, did not try to define or codify presidential war powers. It directed
the President “in every possible instance” to consult with Congress before
sending forces into hostile situations or when hostilities might be imminent.5
If unable to do so, he was to report to Congress within seventy-two hours,
setting forth the circumstances and details of his actions.6 Unless Congress
declared war within 120 days or specifically authorized the use of force, the
President would have to terminate the military operation and remove the
troops.7 Congress could also vote to direct disengagement at any time during
the 120-day period by passing a concurrent resolution.8 A concurrent
resolution passes both houses of Congress but is not presented to the President

1. H.R.J. Res. 1355, 91st Cong. (1970), 116 CONG. REC. 37407 (1970). The House passed
the same bill the next year under suspension of the rules (requiring two-thirds support). H.R.J.
Res. 1, 92d Cong., (1971), 117 CONG. REC. 28870–78 (1971).
2. H.R.J. Res. 1355, 116 CONG. REC. 37398 (1970).
3. H.R.J. Res. 1355 § 2.
4. H.R.J. Res. 1355 § 3.
5. War Powers Resolution, H.R.J. Res. 542, 93d Cong. § 3, 87 Stat. 555 (1973).
6. 119 CONG. REC. 24653–708 (1973).
7. Id.
8. Id.
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for his signature or veto.9 In 1983, the Supreme Court declared this type of
congressional control over executive actions to be unconstitutional.10
II. SENATE ALTERNATIVE
Senator Eagleton regarded the House bill as deficient in protecting
constitutional values and legislative prerogatives. On March 1, 1971, he
introduced legislation to require “that in virtually all cases involving the
initiation of hostilities between United States forces and foreign military
forces, the President would not act without prior authorization from
Congress.”11 He believed that the Framers “were right when they decided to
place the responsibility for going to war in the Congress.”12 Part of the
Framers’ suspicion of executive authority came from what they saw and
experienced during the colonial period, fostering “a deep distrust of inordinate
executive power, as they felt that power being exercised by colonial governors
and by the English king.”13 In reading the debates at the Philadelphia
Convention, the Federalist Papers, and the text of Articles I and II, Eagleton
concluded that “[g]oing to war was intended to be an orderly process in which
deliberation would be given full play before conflict began and in which
reason and caution would be used once hostilities had commenced.”14
Eagleton’s resolution in 1971 recognized that “[n]o treaty previously or
hereafter entered into by the United States shall be construed as authorizing or
requiring the armed forces of the United States to engage in hostilities without
further Congressional authorization.”15 This was a key provision intended to
prevent presidents from unilaterally going to war on the basis of treaties like
the UN Charter or NATO. President Harry Truman went to war against North
Korea in 1950 by seeking “authority” from the UN Security Council.16 That
method of circumventing Congress has been used by other presidents.17

9. WALTER J. OLESZEK, CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURES AND THE POLICY PROCESS, 332
(7th ed., 2007) (explaining congressional procedure when the House and Senate adopt a
concurrent resolution).
10. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 955–59 (1983) (holding a section of the Immigration and
Nationality Act that authorized one house of Congress to invalidate a decision of the Executive
Branch unconstitutional).
11. THOMAS F. EAGLETON, WAR AND PRESIDENTIAL POWER: A CHRONICLE OF
CONGRESSIONAL SURRENDER 121 (1974); see also, 117 CONG. REC. 4405–07 (1971).
12. EAGLETON, supra note 11, at vii.
13. Id. at 5.
14. Id. at 9.
15. 117 CONG. REC. 4405 (1971).
16. LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER 97–100 (2d ed., Univ. Press of Kan. 2004).
17. Louis Fisher, Sidestepping Congress: Presidents Acting under the UN and NATO, 47
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1237, 1237 (1997) (discussing President Truman in Korea, the first
President Bush in Iraq, and President Clinton in Haiti and Bosnia).
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President Bill Clinton, unable to obtain support from the Security Council for
military operations against the Serbs in Kosovo, sought “authority” from
NATO countries.18
Eagleton understood, as did the Framers, the fundamental difference
between offensive and defensive hostilities. If the United States were attacked,
the President could “repel the attack.”19 For any other use of force, “the
judgment of the entire nation, acting through its elected representatives, would
have to be sought.”20 Drawing from those principles, the Senate attempted to
spell out the conditions under which presidents were authorized to take
unilateral action with military force: “(1) to repel an armed attack upon the
United States, its territories, and possessions,” to retaliate in the event of such
an attack, and to “forestall the direct and imminent threat of such an attack”;
(2) to repel an armed attack against U.S. armed forces located outside the
United States, its territories, and possessions, and to “forestall the direct and
imminent threat of such an attack”; and (3) to protect and rescue endangered
American citizens and nationals in foreign countries or at sea.21 The first
situation, except for the final clause, is consistent with the understanding
developed at the Philadelphia Convention.22 The other situations reflect
changes that have occurred in the concept of defensive war and life-andproperty actions.
As passed in 1973, the Senate bill required the President to cease military
action unless Congress, within thirty days, specifically authorized the President
to continue.23 A separate provision allowed him to sustain military operations
beyond the thirty-day limit if he determined that “unavoidable military
necessity respecting the safety” of the armed forces required their continued
use for the purpose of “bringing about a prompt disengagement.”24 Eagleton
voted for the Senate bill.25 Obviously these efforts to draft legislative language
created the risk of ambiguity and uncertainty, particularly by reference to
“imminent” threats and “endangered” citizens.
III. CONFERENCE VERSION
When the bill emerged from conference committee, it had to combine two
entirely different legislative strategies. The House was reluctant to draw any
18. FISHER, supra note 16, at 198–201.
19. EAGLETON, supra note 11, at 10; see also, FISHER, supra note 16, at 8–9.
20. EAGLETON, supra note 11, at 10.
21. S. 2956, 92d Cong. § 3, 118 CONG. REC. 12,611 (1972); S. 440, 93d Cong. § 3, 119
CONG. REC. 25119 (1973). For the full Senate debate in 1972 and 1973, see 118 CONG. REC.
12577–613 (1972) and 119 CONG. REC. 25051–120 (1973).
22. EAGLETON, supra note 11, at 10; FISHER, supra note 16, at 8–10.
23. S. 440, 93d Cong. § 5; 119 CONG. REC. 25119 (1973).
24. S. 440 § 5.
25. 119 CONG. REC. 25119 (1973).
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hard and fast lines; the Senate tried to do precisely that. Most of the time a
conference product can look for compromises that do no fundamental damage
to the Constitution. If one house votes $150 million for a program and the
other $200 million, no harm is done in agreeing to $175 million. For the war
powers bill, however, the compromises produced marked incoherence and
contradictions. Section 2(c) provided that presidential power to engage in
military hostilities is limited to “(1) a declaration of war, (2) specific statutory
authorization, or (3) a national emergency created by attack upon the United
States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces.”26 Yet the bill
authorized the President to use military force for up to ninety days anywhere,
for any reason, without responding to an attack and without any declaration or
authorization by Congress.27 Section 2(a) stated that the purpose of the bill
was “to fulfill the intent of the framers of the Constitution of the United States
and insure that the collective judgment of both the Congress and the President
will apply to the introduction of the United States Armed Forces into
hostilities. . . .”28 Yet the bill clearly broke with the intent of the Framers and
did nothing to assure collective judgment in initiating military force.
Senators who had fought hard to reassert legislative authority over the war
power nevertheless looked with favor upon the conference product and
regarded it as even superior to the Senate version. Senator J. William
Fulbright, after recognizing Senators Eagleton and Jacob Javits as “the two
principal Senate sponsors of this legislation,”29 called the conference bill “a
reasonable compromise.”30 Senator Javits agreed that the bill from conference
was “a measure of reconciliation” and “an excellent vehicle for expressing the
congressional will perhaps better than either of the preceding bills.”31 Senator
Edmund Muskie referred to the conference bill as “a powerful reaffirmation of
congressional responsibility in the warmaking sphere.”32 To Senator Hubert
Humphrey, the bill “represent[ed] one of the finest legislative
accomplishments in [his] memory.”33
Senator Barry Goldwater, who voted against the bill because he thought it
infringed on presidential authority, nevertheless recognized that the conference
version went a long way in expanding presidential power.34 He said he could

26. 119 CONG. REC. 33548 (1973).
27. Id. at 33555–57 (statements of Sen. Eagleton discussing the meaning of Section 4).
28. War Powers Resolution, H.R.J. Res. 542, 93d Cong. § 2(a), 87 Stat. 555 (1973) (The
identical language appeared in the conference version, which became law over President Nixon’s
veto).
29. 119 CONG. REC. 33548 (1973).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 33549.
32. Id. at 33551.
33. Id. at 33552.
34. 119 CONG. REC. 33553 (1973).
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“probably actually vote for” the bill “because it gives the President even
broader powers than the authors of the original bill thought they were
correcting.”35 As rewritten in conference, “the President is no longer
prohibited from initiating original actions. He needs only to report during the
first [sixty] days.”36 Eagleton immediately voiced his support for Goldwater’s
interpretation: “The Senator is precisely correct.”37
Eagleton refused to indulge in the euphoria and self-congratulatory
speeches of Fulbright, Javits, Muskie, Humphrey, and others. Instead, he
rigorously analyzed what the Senate set out to do and compared it to what was
done in conference.38 He pointed out that the House and Senate bills “were not
generally compatible. They marched down separate and distinct roads, almost
irreconcilable roads.”39 After looking at the language in Section 2 that
supposedly limited the President to certain conditions before ordering U.S.
troops into hostilities, he dismissed that section (titled “Purpose and Policy”)
as “precatory words; they are meaningless.”40 As noted above, Section 2 also
included language about fulfilling the intent of the Framers and ensuring the
collective judgment of both branches before introducing American forces to
combat.41 Eagleton examined the substantive sections, such as Section 4, and
told his colleagues that the bill authorized the President to “keep the forces
anywhere in the world for ninety days without Congress doing a thing about
it.”42 The bill produced by the conferees allowed “an open-ended, blank check
for ninety days of warmaking, anywhere in the world, by the President. . . .”43
The bill represented “a near-total abrogation of the Senate position on war
powers.”44
Javits challenged Eagleton’s analysis by claiming that the conference
product “may very well be . . . a stronger statute than [what] the Senate
passed.”45 Enactment of the bill “will make history.”46 Eagleton had no
patience for this rhetoric. “We are not here to make history,” he told Javits,
“we are here to make law.”47 Comparing what the Senate had passed, after

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 33555.
119 CONG. REC. 33555 (1973).
Id.
See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
119 CONG. REC. 33555 (1973).
Id. at 33556.
Id.
Id. at 33558.
Id. at 33559.
119 CONG. REC. 33559 (1973).
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several years of debate, to the bill that came out of conference left Eagleton
with a feeling of repulsion:
Yes, I helped to give birth to the Senate bill three years ago, but the child
has been kidnapped. It is no longer the same child that went into the
conference. It has come out a different baby—and a dangerous baby, Mr.
President. Because this bill does not go one inch in terms of constricting the
unilateral war-making of the President of the United States.
Try as he may, and able lawyer that he is, the Senator from New York
[Javits] cannot get around the language of the statute. He cannot get around
the fact that the purpose and the political effect of section 2(c) is “nothing.”
48
Nobel in concept but worthless in execution.

The Senate agreed to the conference report 75 to 20.49 Eagleton was
among those voting “Nay.”50 The House agreed to the conference report 238
to 123.51 Some of the House members, who had supported a war powers bill
that would protect legislative interests, flagged the deficiencies of the
conference product. Elizabeth Holtzman stated that the Constitution does not
permit the President “without congressional approval to commit U.S. forces to
war, except in certain specific and limited circumstances, such as an
emergency, an attack upon the United States, or an action taken in certain
instances to protect the lives of American citizens and troops abroad.”52 Yet
the bill authorized the President to go to war for sixty to ninety days anywhere
in the world, for any reason, without congressional approval.53 Bella Abzug
pledged to vote against the bill “because it is patently unconstitutional and
gives the President power he does not now have.”54 Ron Dellums understood
that the Senate bill had placed limits on military initiatives by the President but
“the conference version does not even bother to try.”55 Having cleared the
House and the Senate, the bill went to President Nixon for his signature or
veto.
IV. NIXON’S VETO
President Nixon vetoed the bill on October 24, 1973, calling it contrary to
“the wisdom of the Founding Fathers in choosing not to draw a precise and
detailed line of demarcation between the foreign policy powers of the two

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id.
Id. at 33569.
Id.
Id. at 33873–74.
119 CONG. REC. 33868 (1973).
Id. at 33870.
Id.
Id. at 33871.
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branches.”56 The bill “would attempt to take away, by a mere legislative act,
authorities which the President has properly exercised under the Constitution
for almost 200 years.”57 He regarded two provisions of the bill as
unconstitutional: the automatic cut-off of authorities after sixty or ninety days
unless Congress extended them, and the use of a concurrent resolution to
control the President.58 The latter, he pointed out, “does not normally have the
force of law, since it denies the President his constitutional role in approving
legislation.”59
The Senate overrode Nixon’s veto by a vote of 75 to 18, far beyond the
two-thirds required.60 Eagleton voted against the override.61 He reviewed the
fundamental principles that should have guided members of Congress in
drafting a war powers bill:
In essence, the Senate bill said the following: The decision to go to war, under
our Constitution, is a decision for Congress to make. . . . Fresh from the
control of King George, they no longer wanted one man, however decent,
however benign, to make the troublesome and difficult decision to commit the
62
United States to war.

The Senate had attempted to define three emergency situations that would
permit the President to act on his own without any prior authority from
Congress.63 What came out of conference was “a total, complete distortion of
the war powers concept.”64 Some lawmakers looked to the press to see how
well they were doing in upholding legislative prerogatives. Eagleton looked to
constitutional principles and the language of the bill. He noted that:
[T]he media coverage of the bill still says that this limits the President’s war
powers. It does not. The bill gives the President of the United States unilateral
authority to commit American troops anywhere in the world, under any
conditions he decides, for 60 to 90 days. He gets a free 60 days and a self65
executing option for an additional 30 days, making 90.

Having watched the performance of Congress on the war powers bill,
Eagleton said he was “dumbfounded” because for the past five years he had
been present at all of the resolutions and amendments intended to restrict
presidential war power and had heard “Senator after Senator decr[y] the fact

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Veto of the War Powers Resolution, PUB. PAPERS 893 (Oct. 24, 1973).
Id.
Id.
Id.
119 CONG. REC. 36198 (1973).
Id.
Id. at 36177.
Id.
Id.
119 CONG. REC. 36177 (1973).
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that a President had got us involved in a nightmare, and that we should not get
involved in a nightmare again; and that no one man could ever get us involved
in a nightmare again. . . .”66 He asked how Congress, after a decade of
watching the Vietnam War divide the country and consume American lives
and American treasure, could once again give “unbridled, unlimited total
authority to the President to commit us to war.”67
It is extraordinary to review Eagleton’s single-minded focus on the content
and meaning of the war powers bill. Democratic members of the House and
Senate relished the thought of overriding a Nixon veto, having come up short
eight times in a row: “Some of my colleagues will celebrate. The President has
beaten us 8 to 0 so far in the veto league, so some of us are eager for our first
victory. And so there will be some handshakes and some jubilation. But what
a mistake we are about to make.”68 Press accounts and partisan calculations
never diverted Eagleton from his responsibility to see that the Constitution was
protected and defended, which was the oath he took as a Senator.
Javits read Nixon’s veto message as proof that the bill was effective.
Nixon claimed that the bill “would seriously undermine this nation’s ability to
act decisively and convincingly in times of international crisis,” by which
Javits concluded that Nixon thought “his power is very reduced, and drastically
so.”69 Javits found the veto message “the best evidence as to whether we are
grant[ing] additional authority to him.”70 Eagleton did not get sidetracked by
this type of speculation. He interpreted the Constitution and the bill, not veto
messages. Contrary to some of his colleagues who supported the bill and
believed they had reasserted the role of Congress, he said, “I do not view this
as a historic recapture; on the contrary I view it as a historic surrender.”71
After hearing Javits say that “the President will make his calculations and take
his chances that the 60-day period applies,” Eagleton asked Javits whether he
thought “this is a game with the President.”72
The House narrowly overrode Nixon’s veto, voting 284 to 135.73 As in the
Senate, some members of the House knew that Congress was transferring its
power to the President. Others got caught up in partisan calculations that had
nothing to do with the merits of the legislation. William Green remarked that
the bill “has popularly been interpreted as limiting the President’s power to
engage our troops in a war,” but a careful reading of the legislation convinced

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 36178.
Id. at 36188.
119 CONG. REC. 36188 (1973).
Id. at 36189.
Id.
Id. at 36221–22.
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him that it “is actually an expansion of Presidential warmaking power, rather
than a limitation.”74 Vernon Thomson held no illusions about the bill: “The
clear meaning of the words certainly points to a diminution rather than an
enhancement of the role of Congress in the critical decisions whether the
country will or will not go to war.”75 Bob Eckhardt condemned the abdication
of congressional power.76 Ron Dellums, having opposed the House bill and
the conference version, held firm and voted to sustain the veto: “Richard Nixon
is not going to be President forever. Although many people will regard this as
a victory against the incumbent President, because of his opposition, I am
convinced that it will actually strengthen the position of future Presidents.”77
The consistency of Dellums was not matched by some of his colleagues.
He opposed the House bill and the conference product because he regarded
them as bad legislation.78 He therefore voted to sustain Nixon’s veto to
prevent the bill from becoming law.79 Bella Abzug and others voted
erratically, depending on the politics of the moment. She voted against the
House bill and the conference version because they expanded presidential war
power.80 As she noted during debate on the conference report: “[It] gives the
President 60 to 90 days to intervene in any crisis situation, on any pretext,
while Congress merely asks that he tell us what he has done.”81 Yet she
strongly supported a veto override for reasons that had nothing to do with the
quality or substance of the bill. She offered this argument: “This could be a
turning point in the struggle to control an administration that has run amuck. It
could accelerate the demand for the impeachment of the President.”82
Abzug was not alone in voting with one purpose on the House bill and the
conference report and adopting a different purpose on the override. Fifteen
members of the House voted against the House bill and the conference version
because they considered the legislation inadequate and unsound.83 To be
consistent, they should have voted to sustain Nixon’s veto to prevent a bad bill

74. Id. at 36204.
75. 119 CONG. REC. 36207 (1973).
76. Id. at 36208.
77. Id. at 36220.
78. See id.
79. Id. at 36222.
80. 119 CONG. REC. 36222 (1973).
81. Id. at 33870.
82. Id. at 36221.
83. See id. The Representatives the author refers to are: Bella Abzug, Robert Drinan, John
Duncan, John James Flynt, Jr., William Harsha, Ken Hechler, Elizabeth Holtzman, William
Hungate, Phillip Landrum, Trent Lott, Joseph Maraziti, Dale Milford, William Natcher, Frank
Stubblefield, and Jamie Whitten.
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from becoming law. Yet they switched sides and delivered the decisive votes
for enactment.84
CONCLUSION
Throughout the years of debate on the War Powers Resolution, no member
of Congress commanded the field like Tom Eagleton. He developed a
sophisticated and clear understanding of what the Framers intended and why
they thought the way they did. He took that framework of the Constitution, as
adapted over two centuries by precedent and practice, and proceeded to draft
legislation that would be faithful to those constitutional values. Many of his
colleagues, though initially motivated as he was to redress the imbalance
between Congress and the President, lacked his clarity of thought and integrity
of purpose. They did not measure up to his depth of commitment. At no time
did he posture and pretend that the war powers bill, as it came from conference
committee, represented a reassertion of legislative power because that was how
the press viewed it. He did not let his opinion of individuals, such as Richard
Nixon, weaken his ability to evaluate the substance of legislation. One Senator
told him after the override debate: “I heard your argument. I agree with you. I
love the Constitution, but I hate Nixon more.”85 Eagleton did not switch votes,
as many did, by calculating how it might have short-term partisan or political
benefits. He was there for the long term. He had taken an oath to support and
defend the Constitution and that dedication provided all the lodestar he ever
needed. Blessed by intelligence, he was blessed even more by an inner
strength that allowed him to see things as they were and to remain steadfast to
the Constitution.

84. See id.
85. EAGLETON, supra note 11, at 220.
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